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a b s t r a c t
This paper proposes a novel type of RFID application, i.e., RFID seeking. Several existing types of RFID
applications such as monitoring, searching, locating/navigating, are similar with RFID seeking. However,
they are either inapplicable or vulnerable for RFID seeking scenarios, in which a user is to ﬁnd a lost
tagged item in a blind spot, or to ﬁnd a wanted item among a mass of similar ones.
In this paper, detailed requirements for RFID seeking are suggested. The ﬁrst secure RFID seeking
protocol is proposed, meeting all the given requirements. Its security is formally veriﬁed by using the
AVISPA tool. The proposed protocol is server-less, lightweight, privacy-friendly to both RFID readers and
tags, and is secure against common attacks such as eavesdropping, manipulating, replaying, tracing,
Denial of Service (DoS), etc.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) (Sheng et al., 2011) is a
wireless technology that uses radio signal to identify tagged items
remotely. An RFID system is usually composed of RFID readers,
tags, and a centralized database. Tags are either active, requesting
a reader; or passive, responding to a reader's request. An RFID
reader identiﬁes tags according to the centralized database which
is usually stored in a backend server. RFID technology has been
widely used in a series of real-life applications, such as supply
chain management, contactless credit card, inventory control, etc.
However, there are still many security and privacy concerns about
RFID applications (Di Pietro and Molva, 2011; Hancke, 2011; Rizzo
et al., 2011; Avoine et al., 2012; Kardas et al., 2012; Li et al., 2012;
Sakai et al., 2013).
In daily life, people often suffer from item-seeking problems,
i.e. to ﬁnd a lost item in a blind spot, or to ﬁnd a speciﬁed item
among lots of similar ones. For instance, a man tried to ﬁnd his car
key when he was leaving home. After a long time seeking, the key
was ﬁnally found under the sofa; however, he had been late for his
date. For another instance, a professor had a personal library with
a huge collection of books. There were so many books on different
shelves that the professor had to spend quite a lot of time to ﬁnd a
wanted book.
The above problems can be solved in a world of Internet of
Things (IoT) where everyday items are expected to be tagged with
RFID tags. A person can be enabled to quickly ﬁnd a wanted item
by using an RFID reader. This kind of RFID applications is termed
“RFID seeking” in this paper. To our knowledge, there is no current
works specially designed for RFID seeking. Related works are
either inapplicable or vulnerable to RFID seeking scenarios.
RFID Monitoring protocols (Tan et al., 2008a; Zhang et al., 2011;
Li et al., 2010; Tan et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2012) are
designed to detect the missing of tagged items, rather than to seek
a missing tag. A simple method to detect tags' missing is to
identify all tags' IDs periodically by using RFID authentication
protocols. However, this method is rather inefﬁcient. Because, the
authentication must be performed frequently enough among all
tags which may have a huge number. Therefore, the foremost
objective of existing RFID monitoring researches is to improve
time-efﬁciency. Even so, RFID monitoring are only able to detect a
tag's missing, rather than to guide a seeker to ﬁnd the lost tag.
RFID location/navigation applications (Bu et al., 2012; Kim and
Chong, 2009; Ni et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2013;
Digiampaolo and Martinelli, 2014) are to pinpoint/navigate tagged
items, commonly, in indoor environments. A series of tags and/or
readers are deployed as landmarks in a coordinate space. A reader/
tag can be located/navigated/pinpointed by comparing the phases/
strengths of signals received from different landmarks. The appli-
cation scenarios of RFID location/navigation are similar with RFID
seeking. However, these applications are more suitable for indus-
trial utilizations than personal uses, because they rely upon many
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pre-deployed nodes. Obviously, it is unnecessary for a person to
deploy a lot of RFID devices inside his/her house, just for seeking
some lost items occasionally. Besides, the person may lose his/her
items outside the house.
RFID searching (Tan et al., 2007, 2008b; Won et al., 2008; Lin
et al., 2009; Hoque et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012;
Chun et al., 2011) is a special type of RFID authentication. In an
RFID searching protocol, a reader only wants to authenticate a
speciﬁed tag among all tags. Then, the reader can know whether
the speciﬁed tag is among the searched group of tags. RFID
searching protocols can guide a seeker to ﬁnd a wanted tag among
a lot of similar tags. However, the process is rather inefﬁcient. The
seeker has to divide all tagged items into many small groups, and
to search in each group to check if the wanted one is there.
Besides, for a seeker who tries to ﬁnd a lost tag in a blind spot, an
RFID searching application can only warn the seeker that the tag is
nearby, rather than pinpoint the lost tag's position.
Moreover, most RFID searching protocols are unsecure for RFID
seeking. (1) Some protocols (Tan et al., 2007, 2008b; Lin et al.,
2009; Lee et al., 2012) reveal the privacy of mobile reader holders.
A reader's identiﬁer is broadcasted as a constant and plaintext
value in these protocols, enabling an attacker to trace the reader
holder by tracing the reader's identiﬁer. (2) Some protocols (Won
et al., 2008; Hoque et al., 2010; Chun et al., 2011) are vulnerable to
DoS (Denial of Service) attacks. The research (Yoon, 2012) pointed
out that the protocol (Chun et al., 2011) is vulnerable to DoS
attacks due to requiring symmetric encryption on a tag. We notice
that the protocol (Won et al., 2008) has the same vulnerability
with the protocol (Chun et al., 2011). (3) Some protocols (Tan et al.,
2007, 2008b; Won et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011;
Chun et al., 2011) are unsecure to RFID seeking due to lack of
mutual authentication. If a tag did not authenticate a reader while
being authenticated by the reader, the tag would be maliciously
sought by anyone using an unauthorized reader.
An efﬁcient and secure approach to ﬁnd a wanted tag might be
as follows: the seeker uses his RFID reader to broadcast an
encrypted and untraceable message like “I am looking for the
item with the tag ID¼X”. Then, only the wanted tag ID¼X can
understand the request. After mutual authentication between the
tag and the reader, the tag activates its attached indicator. As a
result, the tag-controlled indicator starts a light/sound alarm by
ﬂashing/buzzing, guiding the seeker to ﬁnd the tag directly.
1.1. Contribution
There are two main contributions in this paper: (1) A new type
of RFID application, i.e., RFID seeking is deﬁned and formulated
with detailed requirements. RFID seeking can guide a seeker to
ﬁnd a lost tagged item in a blind spot, or to ﬁnd a wanted tagged item
among a mass of similar ones. (2) A secure RFID seeking protocol is
proposed, meeting all the given requirements simultaneously for the
ﬁrst time. The proposed protocol is server-less, lightweight, privacy-
friendly, and is secure against common attacks such as eavesdropping,
manipulating, replaying, tracing, Denial of Service (DoS), etc.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, RFID
seeking are deﬁned and formulated with detailed requirements
after the presentation of two typical application scenarios.
In Section 3, The ﬁrst secure RFID seeking protocol is proposed
in two phases. Its design concepts are discussed step by step. In
Section 4, the proposed protocol is evaluated, meeting all the
requirements listed in Section 2. Its security is formal veriﬁed by
using AVISPA tool. Its superiority is shown in comparisons with
related works. In Section 5, we give our conclusions and
future works.
2. Problem overview
In this section, RFID seeking is introduced with two exampled
application scenarios, and then presented in a formal way.
Detailed requirements for RFID seeking protocols are also
suggested.
2.1. Application scenarios
RFID seeking is helpful in two kinds of application scenarios.
One application scenario is to ﬁnd a lost item in a blind sport
like a secluded corner. Imagine that, a lady lost an expensive
necklace in her way home. The necklace had been tagged with a
tag-controlled indicator, which would generate sound/light alarms
once the tag was activated. The lady had a PDA embedded with an
RFID reader. She walked back along her track, holding the PDA to
seek the necklace. When she was near the necklace, the tag was
activated by the reader. And then, the tag-controlled indicator
started an alarm via buzzing/ﬂashing, guided the lady to ﬁnd the
lost necklace in bushes Fig. 1.
The other application scenario is to ﬁnd a wanted tagged item
among a mass of similar ones. Imagine that, a postman was
delivering lots of postal packages within a city. For each receiver,
the postman needed to pick a speciﬁed package among similar
others. This work could be very oppressive without automation.
Fortunately, all packages had been tagged with tag-controlled
indicators. The postman was enabled to seek a wanted package
by using his PDA embedded with an RFID reader i.e. after inputting
a receiver's ID, the corresponding tag is activated, and the tag-
controlled indicator starts buzzing/ﬂashing, leading the postman
to ﬁnd the right package quickly.
2.2. Formulation of RFID seeking
Consider an RFID system that consist of a set of readers
R¼ fR1; :::;Ri; :::;Rmg and a set of tags T ¼ fT1; :::; Tj; :::; Tng. Only
Fig. 1. RFID seeking by using tag-controlled indicators.
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the reader Ri is authorized to identify the tags. Each tag has a state
value S¼ fS0; S1g which controls an corresponding attached indi-
cator. In an RFID seeking protocol, a user U who holds Ri, is going
to ﬁnd a special tag Tj which is lost in a blind sport or among a lot
of similar tags. Firstly, Ri broadcasts a request to activate Tj. After
mutual authentication, Tj alters its state from S0 to S1, activating its
indicator to generate sound/light alarms via buzzing/ﬂashing. As a
result, U is navigated to ﬁnd Tj according to the alarming indicator.
Meanwhile, an attacker A may try to compromise the RFID seeking
protocol, and to identify/locate U by tracing Ri or activating Tj in
unauthorized ways.
2.3. Requirements
According to the above formulation and application scenarios,
an RFID seeking protocol should meets some basic requirements as
follows.
1. The protocol should be server-less, i.e. without any intervention
from a backend server to complete the seeking process. That is
because U may use Ri to seek Tj in an ofﬂine location. For
instance, the lady may lose her necklace when she travels to a
remote scenic region; the postman may need to deliver a
package to a suburb or a closed warehouse where there is no
public networks.
2. The protocol should notify a wanted tag that it is sought by a
reader while other tags/readers do not know which tag is sought.
On one hand, if Tj is not informed, the corresponding tag-
controlled indicator cannot be activated to guide U. On the
other hand, if Rsðsa iÞ; Tkðka jÞ are also enabled to know the
identiﬁer of Tj, A can also know what U is looking for, revealing
individual privacy.
3. A reader should broadcast encrypted and inconstant messages to
seek a tag. Otherwise, the identiﬁable/traceable messages of Ri
will reveal U's individual privacy of identity/location. i.e. A can
identify, locate, and trace U according to the broadcasted
messages of Ri.
4. A tag should respond with encrypted and inconstant messages to a
reader. Otherwise, the identiﬁable/traceable messages of Tj will
reveal U's individual privacy of identity/location. i.e. A can
identify, locate, and trace U according to the responded
messages of Tj.
5. The protocol should provide mutual authentication between a
reader and a wanted tag. On one hand, if Ri does not authenti-
cate Tj, U can be misguided by a malicious tag Tkðka jÞ. On the
other hand, if Tj does not authenticate Ri, Tj can be maliciously
sought by A using an unauthorized reader Rsðsa iÞ.
6. The protocol should be lightweight, i.e. the computation capability
required on a tag should be no more than that supporting hashing.
Neither symmetric nor public encryption should be required on
Tj. Otherwise, A are enabled to launch DoS attacks by con-
tinuously requesting Tj which is busy with encrypting and
decrypting (Yoon, 2012).
It is worth noting that, the time-efﬁciency is not listed as a
main design objective in this paper, because it is not as important
as that in an RFID monitoring protocol which identiﬁes a huge
number of tags frequently and periodically. On one hand, in the
ﬁrst application scenario for RFID seeking (i.e. to ﬁnd a lost tagged
item in a blind spot), there are not a huge number of tags to be
authenticated. On the other hand, in the second application
scenario (i.e. to ﬁnd a wanted tagged item among similar ones),
although there may be a huge number of tags, the seeking process
is performed only once when needed, rather than frequently and
periodically performed.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the current works
meet all above requirements for RFID seeking. Actually, in mon-
itoring/searching/navigating/locating protocols, which are similar
with RFID seeking, only some of the requirements are met
(see Table 1).
3. The proposed protocol
In this section, a secure RFID seeking protocol is proposed. It is
composed of an initialization phase and a seeking phase. Its design
concepts are discussed step by step. The notations used in this
paper are described in Table 2.
3.1. Initialization phase
An RFID reader Ri ﬁrst downloads an Access List (AL) from a
certiﬁcate authority (CA). It is worth noting that, the mobile reader
is usually a portable device such as a PDA or a smart phone, rather
than a well protected backend server. If it is stolen, then all tag's
secrets in it would be revealed. To tackle this concern, a reader-
speciﬁc key like HðRijjKjÞ, instead of Kj, is required to be stored in
the AL. In this case, the reader AL is
Li  fðT1;HðRijjK1ÞÞ; :::; ðTj;HðRijjKjÞÞ; :::; ðTn;HðRijjKnÞÞg:
That is, the reader with identiﬁer Ri is given a reader-speciﬁc
key HðRijjKjÞ for each tag. As a result, the reader's identiﬁer Ri is
required to be sent to a tag, enabling the tag to generate the
reader-speciﬁc secret HðRijjKjÞ to be veriﬁed by the reader. How-
ever, we use
Li  fðT1;K1Þ; :::; ðTj;KjÞ; :::; ðTn;KnÞg
to simplify the description in this paper. The reader-stolen issue
can be solved easily by replacing Kj with HðRijjKjÞ.
Each tag Tj has a controlling binary state Sj initialized to be
passive, i.e. Sj ¼ 0. Sj is activated only after a mutual authentication
between the tag Tj and a reader Ri. if Sj is activated, i.e. Sj ¼ 1, the
tag-controlled indicator stars an alarm via buzzing and/or ﬂashing,
guiding the seeker, who holds the authenticated reader Ri, to ﬁnd
the wanted tag Tj. The seeking phase of the proposed protocol is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
3.2. Seeking phase
1. The reader Ri broadcasts α; β;NR to seek a speciﬁed tag Ts,
where α¼HðTsjjNRÞ  Ri and β¼HðRijjNRÞ  Ts.
2. Each nearby tag Tj generates R
0 ¼HðTjjjNRÞ  α and T 0 ¼
HðR0jjNRÞ  β to check if itself is right the wanted tag sought
by the reader. If T 0 ¼ Tj, it means s¼ j, i.e. the reader is seeking
Tj. Then Tj generates ε¼HðKjjjNRjjNT Þ. Otherwise T 0aTj, it
means sa j, the reader is not seeking Tj but another tag. Then
Table 1
Requirements of similar protocol types.
Types Monitoring Searching Navigating
(locating)
Seeking
Requirement#1 Needless Essential Sometimes Essential
Requirement#2 Needless Sometimes Sometimes Essential
Requirement#3 Needless Essential Sometimes Essential
Requirement#4 Needless Essential Sometimes Essential
Requirement#5 Essential Sometimes Sometimes Essential
Requirement#6 Essential Essential Essential Essential
The main
concern
Efﬁciency Security Accuracy Security/
privacy
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Tj generates ε¼ randL. Each nearby tag Tj responds to the reader
with different ε;NT .
3. The reader generates ε0 ¼HðKsjjNRjjNT Þ compared with each
received ε. If there is a matched ε0 ¼ ε, it means the sought tag
is found. Then Ri generates θ¼HðNRjjNT jjKsÞ. Otherwise all ε0aε,
it means the sought tag is not nearby. Then Ri generates θ¼ randL.
The reader Ri responds each tag with a corresponding θ.
4. The sought tag Tj generates θ0 ¼HðNRjjNT jjKjÞ compared with
the received θ. If they are matched, it means that the reader has
the real secret of the tag, i.e. the reader has been authorized to
seek the tag. The tag's controlling state is activated, i.e. Sj ¼ 1,
then, the tag-controlled indicator stars an alarm via buzzing
and/or ﬂashing, guiding the seeker, who holds the authenti-
cated reader Ri, to ﬁnd the wanted tag Tj.
3.3. Discussion
The design concepts in the seeking phase is discussed step by
step as follows:
1st step: The reader generates and broadcasts α¼ HðTsjjNRÞ
Ri. It can be viewed as an encrypted form of Ri while HðTsjjNRÞ is
the one-time pad key. The reader also generates and broadcasts
β¼HðRijjNRÞ  Ts. It can be viewed as an encrypted form of Ts
while HðRijjNRÞ is the one-time pad key. The random number NR is
used as a fresh seed to make the key inconstant in each session.
Due to both the reader's identiﬁer Ri and the wanted tag's
identiﬁer Ts are transmitted in forms with conﬁdentiality and
freshness, the ﬁrst step is resistant against common attacks such
as eavesdropping, manipulating, replaying, tracing, DoS, etc.
2nd step: Only the sought tag Tj ¼ Ts is able to generate the
matched key HðTjjjNRÞ ¼HðTsjjNRÞand obtain the real R0 ¼ Ri by
calculating
R0 ¼ α  HðTjjjNRÞ ¼ ðHðTsjjNRÞ  RiÞ  HðTjjjNRÞ:
Having the real R0 ¼ Ri enables the sought tag Tj ¼ Ts to
generate the matched key HðR0jjNRÞ ¼HðRijjNRÞ and check if itself
is the wanted tag by verifying T 0 ¼ Tj where
T 0 ¼ β  HðR0jjNRÞ ¼ ðHðRijjNRÞ  TsÞ  HðR0jjNRÞ:
And then, the wanted tag generates and responds with
ε¼HðKjjjNRjjNT Þ where NT as well as NR are random numbers to
provide freshness. Each unwanted tag responds a ε¼ randL. All
these responses are with the same bit length L and are always
changed as or like random numbers. To our knowledge, it is
infeasible to launch any valid attacks on them.
3rd step: The reader veriﬁes each received ε and responds with
a corresponding θ. It can be a meaningful hashed value
θ¼HðNRjjNT jjKsÞ or a meaningless random number θ¼ randL,
according to whether the wanted tag is nearby. However, in both
cases, θ is with freshness and conﬁdentiality, i.e. it is inconstant,
hashed/random with the same bit length L, thus, invulnerable to
known attacks.
4th step: The wanted tag veriﬁes the reader's θ to authenticate
the reader. With the help of mutual authentication, attackers with
unauthorized readers are infeasible to maliciously seek a tag via
activating the tag's controlling state to trigger the tag-controlled
indicator.
4. Analysis, veriﬁcation, evaluation and comparison
This section shows that the proposed protocol is eligible for
RFID seeking and better than existing works in many aspects.
4.1. Analysis of complexity and resistance
4.1.1. Tags' computation capability requirement
The proposed scheme does not meet the Class 1 Generation 2
(C1G2) standard (Chien and Chen, 2007), because it requires a tag
to support a hash function. Therefore, it is not a standard light-
weight scheme. However, most RFID authentication schemes
require a hash function implemented by a tag (see e.g. Tan et al.,
2007, 2008b; Won et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2009; Hoque et al., 2010;
Kim et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012). It can greatly enhances a
scheme's security, while increasing the cost of a tag only in a
reasonable range. Moreover, using a hash function does not
necessarily require a lot more logic gates in the tag. For instance,
the research (Guo et al., 2011) presented a lightweight hash-
function family, suitable for extremely constrained devices such as
passive RFID tags.
4.1.2. The number of communication steps
The proposed scheme provides mutual authentication in only
three communication steps. This is the least number of steps
essential for mutual authentication theoretically and practically.
i.e. in the 1st step, the reader challenges the tag; in the 2nd step,
the tag responds to and challenges the reader; in the 3rd step, the
reader responds to the tag.
Table 2
Notations and descriptions.
Notation Description
Ri;R
0 Identiﬁers of readers, with bit length L
Tj ; Ts; T
0 Identiﬁers of tags, with bit length L
NR A random number generated by a reader
NT A random number generated by a tag
randL A random number with bit length L
Kj The secret of the tag Tj.
Sj The controlling state of Tj. It is either passive or active. i.e. SjAf0;1g
Li An access list downloaded by the reader Ri from a certiﬁcate agency
HðUÞ An one-way hash function with output length L. i.e.
HðUÞ : f0;1gn-f0;1gL
 XOR operation
jj Concatenation operation
n The number of tags in an Access List
Fig. 2. The proposed seeking phase.
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4.1.3. Collision of tags
In the proposed protocol, there may be a lot of responding tags
nearby the reader. To avoid collision of tags, on one hand, an
optional approach is that: not all but only a part of unwanted tags
responds to the reader. On the other hand, an anti-collision
scheme can be used. However, RFID anti-collision is an indepen-
dent research ﬁeld with many mature works (Zhen et al., 2005;
Myung et al., 2006; Shih et al., 2006; Klair et al., 2010; Gandino
et al., 2011; Namboodiri et al., 2012; Djeddou et al., 2013). This
paper is not aimed at designing an RFID anti-collision protocol.
The proposed protocol is resistant against common attacks
such as
4.1.4. Resistance against eavesdropping and manipulating
Besides random numbers, only hashed values are transmitted
in the proposed protocol. Therefore, important values such as
reader-identiﬁer, tag-identiﬁer, tag-key cannot be extracted from
eavesdropped messages which are hashed. Similarly, an attacker
cannot manipulate the hashed messages validly without corre-
sponding secret values.
4.1.5. Resistance against replaying and tracing
All the hashed messages transmitted in the proposed protocol
contain random numbers which are generated by readers and/or
tags. Protocol messages are unique for each session, defending
against replaying and tracing attacks.
4.1.6. Resistance against DoS attacks
The proposed protocol does not rely upon any synchronized
state between tags and readers. Therefore, attackers cannot stop
tags from being authenticated again by desynchronization attacks.
Moreover, high-level algorithms are not required to executed by
tags. Thus, attackers cannot launch DoS attacks by requesting a tag
continuously.
It is worth noting that, the wanted tag's alarm via buzzing/
ﬂashing may be exploited by an attacker. For example, the attacker
may approach the wanted tag before the seeker. This attack can be
prevented by using specialized headphone/glasses, making the
buzzing/ﬂashing only audible/visible to the seeker. Actually, this
paper focus more on attacks in protocol layer than in practice.
4.2. Formal veriﬁcation
In this subsection, the security of the proposed protocol is
proofed by using an automatic formal veriﬁcation tool.
Among currently available automated protocol veriﬁcation
tools, Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications (AVISPA) (Armando et al., 2005) has gained the
considerable attention of the industry to practice fast veriﬁcations.
AVISPA is a tool for building and analyzing security protocols. This
tool provides a role-based, expressive formal language for protocol
speciﬁcation and integrates four different back-ends, which per-
form the actual analysis of the protocol.
The formal speciﬁcation language used in AVISPA is called High
Level Protocol Speciﬁcation Language (HLPSL). To verify a protocol
in AVISPA tool, it is necessary to model the candidate protocol and
the intruder in HLPSL (von Oheimb, 2005), and to execute the
actual analysis.
AVISPA tools employ four back-ends to tackle validation of
security protocols: On-the-ﬂy Model-Checker (OFMC), Constraint-
Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-ATSE), SAT-based Model-Checker
(SATMC) and Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations
for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). The architecture of
AVISPA is shown in Fig. 3.
The proposed password update phase is formalized in HLPSL as
in Fig. 4, and the result of AVISPA is shown in Fig. 5. OFMC and CL-
ATSE output SAFE while SATMC and TA4SP output INCONCLUSIVE,
because only OFMC and CL-ATSE can verify the protocols that
use algebraic properties of exclusive-or (XOR) and modular
exponentiation.
4.3. Evaluation
The proposed protocol meets all the requirements listed in
Section 2.3 for RFID seeking.
Fig. 3. The architecture of AVISPA.
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4.3.1. Server-less
It is without any intervention from a backend server to
complete the seeking process. A reader downloads an AL from a
CA in initialization phase. It is online. However, the reader seeks a
special tag via the AL in seeking phase. It is ofﬂine and server-less.
The protocol works well even in an environment where there are
no networks.
It is worth noting that, the term “serverless” commonly means
that a backend server is needless in authentication (seeking)
phase, rather than in initialization phase. Actually, to our knowl-
edge, current RFID protocols which are claimed as serverless, all
need third parties in initialization phases. (see. e.g. Tan et al., 2007,
2008b; Won et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2009; Hoque et al., 2010; Kim
et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012; Chun et al., 2011).
4.3.2. Providing seeking and monitoring
The protocol informs a wanted tag that it is sought by a reader
while other tags do not know which tag is sought. On one hand,
the sought tag is notiﬁed by checking Ts ¼ Tj in the second step,
and later triggers its tag-controlled indicator to guide the seeker.
On the other hand, other tags are infeasible to obtain either the
real Ri or the speciﬁed Ts, prevented from knowing which tag is
sought by which reader. Moreover, the reader knows whether the
sought tag is nearby checking if ε0 ¼ ε in the third step. i.e. the
proposed protocol also provides RFID monitoring in which a tag's
absence can be detected.
Fig. 4. The speciﬁcation of the proposed protocol in HLPSL.
Fig. 5. The veriﬁcation results issued by the AVISPA tool.
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4.3.3. Privacy-friendly to readers
A reader broadcasts encrypted and inconstant messages to seek
a tag. In the ﬁrst step, the reader Ri broadcasts α; β;NR, where NR
is a random number making the hash-based encryption α¼
HðTsjjNRÞ  Ri and β¼HðRijjNRÞ  Ts fresh. Attackers are infeasible
to crack Ri without Ts. It is infeasible to maliciously identify or trace
the seeker by indentifying and tracing Ri.
4.3.4. Privacy-friendly to tags
A tag responds with hashed and inconstant messages to a
reader. In the second step, if Tj is the sought reader, it will generate
ε¼HðKjjjNRjjNT Þ, which is a keyed hashed value with random salt
NR;NT . Otherwise, Tj will generate ε¼ randL, which is a random
number with the same bit length of the valid ε¼HðKjjjNRjjNT Þ.
Each nearby tag responds to the reader with unique and untrace-
able ε;NT , preventing attackers from identifying or tracing a tag.
4.3.5. Provide mutual authentication
The protocol provides mutual authentication between a reader
and a sought tag. On one hand, in the third step, the reader
authenticates the wanted tag by verifying ε0 ¼ ε, disabling a forged
tag to misguide the seeker. One the other hand, in the last step, the
wanted tag authenticates the reader by verifying θ0 ¼ θ, disabling
an unauthorized seeker to seek the tag.
4.3.6. Lightweight
Only hashing and PRNG (Pseudo Random Noise Generation) are
required on a tag. Neither symmetric nor public encryption is
required. Therefore, the protocol is resistant to the DoS attacks
which continuously request a tag with limited resource.
4.4. Comparison
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed protocol is the ﬁrst
protocol meeting all the requirements listed in Section 2.3 for RFID
seeking. According to the comparisons in Table 3, the proposed
protocol is distinguished from current RFID searching protocols
which are the most similar with RFID seeking.
The proposed protocol and the protocols (Tan et al., 2007,
2008b; Won et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2009; Hoque et al., 2010; Lee
et al., 2012) provide RFID monitoring and seeking while the
protocols (Kim et al., 2011; Chun et al., 2011) only support RFID
monitoring. In the proposed protocol and the protocols (Tan et al.,
2007, 2008b; Won et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2009; Hoque et al., 2010;
Lee et al., 2012), there is an approach for a tag to check if itself is
the sought tag by the reader; and the reader knows whether the
sought tag is nearby. Whereas in the protocols (Kim et al., 2011;
Chun et al., 2011), only the reader knows whether the searched tag
is nearby, there is no approach for a tag to check if itself is the
searched tag by the reader. If there is a tag-controlled indicator,
it cannot be activated by the tag to guide the seeker.
The proposed protocol and the protocols (Tan et al., 2007,
2008b; Lin et al., 2009; Hoque et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Lee
et al., 2012) are lightweight while the protocols (Won et al., 2008;
Chun et al., 2011) employ high-level algorithms. In the proposed
protocol and the protocols (Tan et al., 2007, 2008b; Lin et al., 2009;
Hoque et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012), a tag is only
required to support hashing and PRNG which can be viewed as
lightweight to a passive tag. Whereas in the protocols (Won et al.,
2008; Chun et al., 2011) symmetric encryption is required on a tag,
making these protocols away from lightweight. Moreover, as a
result, the protocols (Won et al., 2008; Chun et al., 2011) are
vulnerable to the DoS attacks in which attackers continuously
request a tag to make it busy with encrypting and decrypting.
The proposed protocol and the protocols (Won et al., 2008;
Hoque et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Chun et al., 2011) preserve
privacy of mobile reader holders while the protocols (Tan et al.,
2007, 2008b; Lin et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2012) reveal users' privacy.
In the proposed protocol and the protocols (Won et al., 2008; Chun
et al., 2011), a reader's identiﬁer is encrypted before broadcasted;
in the protocol (Hoque et al., 2010), a reader is not labeled with an
identiﬁer; in the protocol (Kim et al., 2011), a reader's identiﬁer is
different when searching different tags. Thus, in these protocols,
attackers are prevented from tracing a seeker via tracing a reader's
identiﬁer. Whereas, in the protocols (Tan et al., 2007, 2008b; Lin
et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2012), a reader's identiﬁer is constant and
broadcasted without any encryption or hashing, revealing the
identity and location privacy of the seeker who holds the reader
to seek a tag.
The proposed protocol and the protocols (Hoque et al., 2010;
Lee et al., 2012) provide mutual authentication between a tag and
a reader, while the protocols (Tan et al., 2007, 2008b; Won et al.,
2008; Lin et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Chun et al., 2011) only
provide unilateral authentication in which the tag is authenticated
by the reader. Because the reader is not authenticated by the tag,
the tag's owner can be maliciously traced by attackers using an
unauthorized reader.
5. Conclusions and future works
Our main contributions in this paper include: (1) A novel type
of RFID application protocol, i.e. RFID seeking has been formulated
with detailed requirements. It can guide a user to ﬁnd a lost tagged
item in a blind spot or a wanted item among a mass of similar
Table 3
Comparisons.
Protocols Tan (Tan et al., 2007,
2008b)
Won (Won et al.,
2008)
Lin (Lin et al.,
2009)
Hoque (Hoque et al.,
2010)
Kim (Kim et al.,
2011)
Lee (Lee et al.,
2012)
Chun (Chun et al.,
2011)
Ours
Server-less √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Applicable to
monitoring
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Applicable to
Seeking
√ √ √ √  √  √
Lightweight √  √ √ √ √  √
Preserving readers'
privacy
 √  √ √  √ √
Preserving tags'
privacy
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Mutual
authentication
   √  √  √
DoS resistance √  √  √ √  √
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ones. (2). We have proposed the ﬁrst RFID seeking protocol
meeting all the given requirements. It is server-less, lightweight,
privacy-friendly to both readers and tags, and is secure against
common attacks such as eavesdropping, manipulating, replaying,
tracing, DoS, etc.
The main limitations of this study include: (1) The proposed
protocol still requires hashing on a tag, failing to meet C1G2 (Class
1 Generation 2) standard. (2) This academic paper does not
provide a concrete hardware realization of the tag-controlled
indicator because, actually, the realization of the tag-controlled
indicator requires more adequate professional knowledge of hard-
ware, which is beyond our research. However, our future work is
to improve the protocol to be ultra-lightweight, and to implement
a real RFID seeking application.
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